Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

Kim S. Black v. Jon Cornell Black : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randy S. Ludlow; Attorney for Petitioner.
Asa E. Kelley; Tesch Law Offices; Scott W. Hansen; Lewis Hansen Waldo and Pleshe; Attorneys for
Respndent.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Black v. Black, No. 20071014 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/623

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KIM S. BLACK,
Appellant/Petitioner,
vs.

Appellate Case No. 20071014

JON CORNELL BLACK,
Appellee/Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

RANDY S. LUDLOW, #2011
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Scott W. Hansen, #1347
Lewis Hansen Waldo & Pleshe, LLC
Eight East Broadway, Suite 410
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Asa E. Kelley, # 7905
The Law Office of Asa E. Kelley, LLC
859 East 900 South, Ste 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Attorneys for Appellee/Respondent

"" ED
—ATE COURT*

AUG 2 1 2008

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KIMS BLACK,
Appellant/Petitionei,
vs.

Appellate Case No 20071014

JON CORNELL BLACK,
Appellee/Respondent

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

RANDY S LUDLOW, #2011
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Scott W Hansen, #1347
Lewis Hansen Waldo & Pleshe, LLC
Eight East Broadway, Suite 410
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Asa E Kelley, # 7905
The Law Office of Asa E Kelley, LLC
859 East 900 South, Ste 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Attorneys for Appellee/Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

li

ARGUMENT

1-4

I.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-5(10)
DOES NOT GIVE THE TRIAL COURT THE DISCRETION TO
RETROACTIVELY TERMINATE ALIMONY BASED ON
COHABITATION
1-3

II.

IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT IT A COURT HAS
DISCRETION TO TERMINATE ALIMONY RETROACTIVELY
BASED ON COHABITATION UNDER UTAH CODE SECTION 305-3(10), THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD ALSO HAVE DISCRETION
OVER THE LENGTH OF TIME OF RETROACTIVITY, BUT NOT
BEYOND THE TIME WHEN NOTICE OF THE ACTION TO
TERMINATE ALIMONY BASED ON COHABITATION WAS
RECEIVED
3-5

III.

THE LONGSTANDING RULE UNDER UTAH STATUTES AND
COMMON LAW PROVIDES THAT TRIAL COURTS MAY MAKE
RETROACTIVE ALIMONY MODIFICATIONS ONLY TO THE
DATE A MODIFICATION PETITION IS SERVED
5-7

CONCLUSION

7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

8

ADDENDUM

(Refer to Addendum attached to Brief of Appellant)

u

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986)

1-2

Wall v. Wall 2007 UT App 61, \ 20, 157 P.3d 341

2-3

Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah App. 1995)
Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, 35 P.2d 341

3
5-6

STATUTES
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 30-3-5(9)

1,2

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 30-3-5(10) (West 2004)

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45-9.3(4) (West 2004) (now renumbered as § 78B-12-112

(4)(2008))
UTAH CODE ANN.

1,2,7

3,4,5
§ 30-3-10.6(2) (now renumbered and amended at 78B-12-112(4)

(2008)

6
RULES

Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

in

7

ARGUMENT
L
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-5(10)
DOES NOT GIVE THE TRIAL COURT THE DISCRETION TO
RETROACTIVELY TERMINATE ALIMONY BASED ON
COHABITATION,
Utah Code section 30-3-5(10) provides, "[a]ny order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a foimei spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony
that the foimer spouse is cohabitatmg with another person " UTAH CODE ANN § 30-35(10) (West 2004) This section clearly provides that alimony is to be terminated
prospectively upon the establishment of cohabitation and does not allow for retroactive
termination of alimony The legislature knows how to give a court authority to modify an
alimony award reti oactively, (see e g UTAH CODE ANN § 78B-12-112(4) (2008)
(previously numbered as 78-45-9 3(4)) but did not do so The legislature also knows how
to terminate alimony automatically upon a stated event, such as death or remarriage, (see
§ 30-3-5(9)), but did not provide that alimony be terminated automatically upon the event
of cohabitation
An analysis of Utah Code section 30-3-5(10) will show that the legislature never
intended alimony to be terminated retroactively on the basis of cohabitation For the
purpose of ascertaining statutory intent, we note that before alimony can be terminated,
the party paying alimony must establish "that the former spouse is cohabitatmg with
another person," § 30-3-5(10) (emphasis added), and not that "the former spouse was
cohabitatmg with another person " One of the reasons for the use of the present tense m
this section is to make sure that there is a sufficiently solid relationship, such that the

1

needs of the spouse and any children will be provided for In Paffel v Pafjel, the court
explained that the purpose of spousal support is to enable the spouse receiving alimony
payments to maintain a standaid of living enjoyed during the mairiage and to prevent the
spouse fiom becoming a public chaige Pajjel v Paffel, 732 P 2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)
Drafting section 30-3-5(10) in the piesent tense shows that the legislature
envisioned a scenario where the payee spouse is piesently cohabitatmg with another
peison who will provide financial support This suppoit from the new cohabitant will
leplace the lost alimony payments and thus prevent the spouse from becoming a public
charge To require the payor spouse to prove that the payee spouse is presently
cohabitatmg with another person shows that the legislature never intended that alimony
be terminated retroactively
A similar motive is seen m Utah Code section 30-3-5(9), which provides, "any
order of the court that a party pay alimony to a lormer spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the aclion of annulment and his rights are detei mined "
(West 2004) The fact that alimony can be reinstated even after a marriage with
accompanying cohabitation shows that the legislature is concerned with the solidarity of
the relationship
Respondent argues that the court should have discretion over whether to terminate
alimony retroactively Respondent's Bi at 11 As support for this proposition,
Respondent cites Wall v Wall "The legislature's use of 'may' clearly gives the court
2

discretion to make child support modification retroactive." Respondent's Br. at 11; Wall
v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, 1j 20, 157 P.3d 341. However, in Wall, the court was quoting
language from Utah Code section 78B-12-112(4) (previously numbered as 78-45-9.3(4)).
Respondent devotes about four pages to explaining why section 78B-12-112(4) is
inapposite to this issue and why section 30-5-3(10) should apply. Respondent's Br. at 812. If section 78B-12-112(4) does not apply to this issue, as Respondent urges, the court
should not have the discretion authorized by that section to modify alimony retroactively.
Respondent cites Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah App. 1995), as precedent for
the proposition that alimony may be terminated retroactively based on cohabitation.
While it is true that the Court of Appeals in Sigg upheld the trial court's decision, which
included a retroactive termination of alimony, Id. at 917-18, the issue of whether a court
could retroactively terminate alimony was not directly addressed. The trial court in Sigg
modified alimony retroactively to the date of cohabitation, which was eight (8) months
before the petition to modify was filed. The statutes and case law argued herein were not
addressed or raised in Sigg nor is the holding in Sigg applicable herein because it didn't
address these issues. In this case more than five (5) years have elapsed and to
retroactively terminate alimony to the date of cohabitation would result in significant
hardship and injustice. The continuances and delays in this matter are not attributable to
the Appellant and it is not appropriate that she should be the party to suffer what is
proposed by the Respondent.
II.
IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT A COURT HAS
DISCRETION TO TERMINATE ALIMONY RETROACTIVELY BASED
ON COHABITATION UNDER UTAH CODE SECTION 30-5-3(10), THE
3

TRIAL COURT SHOULD ALSO HAVE DISCRETION OVER THE
LENGTH OF TIME OF RETROACTIVITY, BUT NOT BEYOND THE
TIME WHEN NOTICE OF THE ACTION TO TERMINATE ALIMONY
BASED ON COHABITATION WAS RECEIVED.
Respondent aigues that if the tnal court judge letroactively terminates alimony,
he has no discretion o\er the time penod of retroactivity, but must terminate alimony to
the date cohabitation began Respondenf s Br at 15 If this Court determines that Utah
Code section 30-5-3(10) gives the tnal court discretion over whethei to teimmate
alimony retroactively, it would be more consistent with the statutory framewoik to allow
the judge to determine both whether the award should be retroactive and the period of
retroactivity, as in section 78B-12-112(4) (pieviously numbered as 78-45-9 3(4))
However, the trial court should not have discretion to terminate alimony
retroactively to a date prior to when notice was given of the action to terminate alimony
based on cohabitation Section 78B-12-] 12(4) (previously numbered as 78-45-9 3(4)
allows for the retroactive modification of spousal support orders That section also has a
limitation "A child or spousal support payment under a support order may be modified
with respect to any period during which a modification is pending, but only from the date
of service of the pleading on the obligee,

" Id Because section 30-5-3(10) is silent

legarding the court's power to retroactively terminate alimony based on cohabitation, if
this Court decides that retroactive termination is permissible, it should also adopt the
limitation of section 78B-12-112(4) (pieviously numbeied as 78-45-9 3(4) which tempers
the harsh results that can result when alimony is terminated retroactively In this case,
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notice of the action to terminate alimony based on cohabitation was received m June of
2005, so the teimination of alimony should not extend to a date previous to that date
The Respondent, when he requested to amend his petition for modification in June
2005, placed in the amended petition a request for the ruling to be nunc pro tunc The
Respondent knew that the request was contrary to statute and the existing case law which
is why the lequest was made Appellant opposed the amendment and lequested that the
tnal court lequire that a new petition for modification be filed and served and furnished
to the trial court the statutory and case law basis of why that should be done supporting
her position (See Exhibits C and D which are attached to Appellant's Brief See also R
346-349 and 356-357 ) The arguments as made by Appellant in opposing the amended
petition for modification are applicable here and support the position as contained in the
then statute of UCA §78-45-9 3(4) prohibiting modification of the alimony anytime
earlier than when the Respondent amended his petition for modification in June 2005
III. THE LONGSTANDING RULE UNDER UTAH STATUTES AND
COMMON LAW PROVIDES THAT TRIAL COURTS MAY MAKE
RETROACTIVE ALIMONY MODIFICATIONS ONLY TO THE DATE A
MODIFICATION PETITION IS SERVED.
In Wilde v Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, the court squarely addressed the issue of
retroactive modification of alimony
Under the statutes discussed above and Utah common law, we conclude trial
courts have the discretion to award modified alimony retroactively to the date a
modification petition is served The Utah Supreme Court has suggested that courts
have the discretion to retroactively award modified alimony for the period during
which a modification is pending See Marks v Marks, 98 Utah 400, 404, 100 P 2d
207, 209 (Utah 1940) (noting "comt[s] do[] not have the power to
modify an
installment of alimony which has accrued pnor to the making of the application to
modify the decree" (emphasis added)) (citing Myers v Myers, 62 Utah 90, 218 P
5

123 (Utah 1923)). This is clearly the majority rule. See Hill v. Hill, 435 S.E.2d
766, 768 (N.C. 1993) (m[A] majority of the courts of other states which have
considered the question have held a trial court may make modifications effective
as of the date the petition is filed.'" (quoting Kruse v. Kruse, 464 N.E.2d 934, 938
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984))); Trezvant v. Trezvant, 403 A.2d 1134, 1138 (D.C. 1979)
("[T]he few cases addressing this question in other jurisdictions have also
concluded that orders increasing support payments may, in the discretion of the
trial judge, be retroactive to the date when application for the increase was made."
(citing McArthur v. McArthur, 106 So. 2d 73, 76 (Fla. 1958) (citations omitted)));
cf.Shelton v. Shelton, 885 P.2d 807, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (concluding
retroactive award of alimony was within trial court's discretion because obligor
deceived court regarding income and other equities were not present).
Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, ^ 23.
In Wilde, the court was analyzing Utah Code section 30-3-10.6(2), which is now
renumbered and amended at 78B-12-112(4) (2008). That section provides in relevant
part, "(4) A child or spousal support payment under a support order may be modified
with respect to any period during which a modification is pending, but only from the date
of service of the pleading on the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or on the obligor,
if the obligee is the petitioner." Although Respondent contends that section 78B-12112(4) should not apply to a petition to terminate alimony based on cohabitation,
(Respondent's Br. at 8-12), we note that the Wilde court did not rely solely on the above
statute, but based its decision on both "the statutes . . . and Utah common law." Wilde v.
Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, ^f 23 (emphasis added). Utah law thus clearly provides in both
statutes and case law that alimony may be modified retroactively only to the date of
service of the modification petition, which in this case is June 2005.
Recognizing the law that prevents retroactive modification of alimony previous to
the service of the modification petition, the trial court below made a retroactive
modification of alimony to the date of the modification petition, which was on June 7,
6

2001 (R 76-80) However, we argue that this decision was error or abuse of discretion
foi two (2) reasons First, Respondent failed to prosecute the 2001 claim, See Petr's Br
at 4, and should be estopped or piecluded fiom using the 2001 date because of the
doctiine of laches Second, the cohabitation claim was entirely different from the claim
on which the 2001 modification petition was based, and did not provide petitionei notice
of the cohabitation claim See Petr's Br at 11-12 Instead of using the June 2001 date,
the trial court should have used the date of June 2005, when the cohabitation claim was
made, (R 748 ), as the earliest date to which alimony could be retroactively modified
CONCLUSION
Under the plain language of Utah Code section 30-3-5(10), alimony may not be
terminated retioactively If this Court holds that alimony may be terminated
retroactively, such termination should not relate back further than when notice of the
action to terminate alimony based on cohabitation is received
Wherefore, Kim S Black prays that this Court reverse the judgment and order of
the trial court and hold that retroactive termination of alimony is inconsistent with section
30-3-5(10) Additionally, this Court should deny Respondent's request for attorney's
fees and costs, (see Br of Respondent at 15), as Respondent does not set forth a "legal
basis for such an award" as required by Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Proceduie The tual couit did not award attorney fees, nor should this court
DATED this Jtl

day of August, 2008
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